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Some Ethical Considerations for Judicial Clerks
JOHN PAUL JONES*
INTRODUCTION
Since 1875, new law graduates have served judges of federal and state
courts as legal researchers, executive assistants, and professional confidants.I
In return, the best of the newest lawyers have gotten a chance to complement
their classroom education with field study of bench and bar-from behind
the bench. The ideal relationship which should develop between law clerks 2
and their judges is symbiotic: the judges enjoying the energies and fresh per-
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author wishes to thank Wil-
liam 0. Quirey, Jr., University of Richmond School of Law Class of 1992 for diligence and acuity as
a research assistant. This article grew out of a chapter in A Guide for Judicial Clerks in State
Courts, produced by the author as part of a judicial clerkship education project supported by a grant
from the State Justice Institute, a private, non-profit corporation created by Congress in 1984 to
futher the development and adoption of improved judicial administration in state courts. See 42
U.S.C. § 10701 (1988).
1. Horace Gray first employed a recent law graduate as a personal assistant when he was Chief
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court and his half brother, John Chipman Gray, was a pro-
fessor at Harvard Law School. Justice Gray took the practice with him to the United States
Supreme Court in 1882. J. OAKLEY & R. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
11 (1980). The first official mention of clerical assistance for Supreme Court Justices was made in
the 1885 Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States which recommended statu-
tory provision of stenographic assistance, a recommendation which was acted on in the Sundry
Civil Act of August 4, 1886 (24 Stat. 254 (1886)). Within two years each of the nine Justices
employed an assistant. Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justice" The Law Clerks, 40
OR. L. Rnv. 299, 301 (1961). Law clerks appeared in the chambers of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in 1930, J. OAKLEY & R. THOMPSON, supra, at 32 n.2.86), and within the next several years
began serving jurists of the highest courts of Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, and Penn-
sylvania as well. Id. at 18. See also Dorsen, Law Clerks in Appellate Courts in the United States, 26
MOD. L. REv. 265 (1963). An abridged version of the Oakley and Thompson book appears as Law
Clerks in Judges' Eye&" Tradition and Innovation in the Use of Legal Staff by American Judges, 67
CALIF. L. REv. 1286 (1979).
2. In this article, the term "law clerk" is treated as synonymous with the term "judicial clerk."
They both denote recent law school graduates who spend a year or two as paid members of the
personal staff of a judge, performing legal research, drafting and editing court documents, and
otherwise assisting the judge. Some judges (eg., those of the California Supreme Court) prefer to
engage lawyers as a career, rather than employ lawyers for only one or two years. J. OAKLEY & R.
THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 31. Many courts also employ staff attorneys. Staff attorneys too can be
either recent law graduates or career professionals who assist one or more judges in the court's
work. Judicial clerks and staff attorneys are as easily distinguished by their situations as by their
functions: judicial clerks are selected by judges, work directly for judges, and share their chambers;
staff attorneys are selected by a senior lawyer employed by the court, operate under that lawyer's
direction, and share a central office in the courthouse. A law clerk who works for more than one
judge can look a lot like a staff attorney, just as a staff attorney continuously assisting a particular
judge with a complex case can, after a while, look a lot like that judge's personal clerk. In terms of
what they do and learn, distinctions between judicial clerks and staff attorneys are insignificant. But
cf 15 Comp. Gen. 765 (1936) (a judge's clerk works for the judge not the court, so that the Federal
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spectives of brand new professionals rated top among their contemporaries
by law professors, and the law clerks obtaining tutorials by senior jurists
regarded as among the best by their former peers at the bar.
The special relationship between judge and clerk raises special questions of
professional conduct for both. Various published standards supply at least
some of the answers. Once a law clerk has been admitted to the bar, he will
be bound by the standards expressed in his bar's code of professional respon-
sibility. 3 As the trusted agent of a judge, a clerk is regarded by some courts
as bound by the judicial standards binding his principal. 4 Law clerks in fed-
eral courts are bound by a code designed particularly for them. 5 Law clerks
in some state courts are expressly charged with adherence to particular local
standards, 6 although no code has yet been developed for general application
to the conduct of law clerks in state courts.7 These clerks are therefore
bound, if at all, only by the patchwork quilt consisting of bar standards appli-
cable after admission and bench standards applicable by derivation.
CODIFIED STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO LAW CLERKS
All attorneys, including law clerks, are bound as soon as they acquire
membership in their local bar by standards of professional conduct adopted
by their bar. These are generally based in whole or in part on the American
Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility or Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.8 Sections of these codes that are of particular rele-
vance to a law clerk are:
prohibition on appointment of family members may not apply.) See infra notes 44-45 and accom-
panying text.
While still in school, law students sometimes perform on a part-time basis some or all of the
duties assigned a law clerk or staff attorney. These typically unpaid assistants are called "interns"
or "externs," sometimes depending on whether their work at the court earns them law school cred-
its for clinical education. This article is intended as much for their edification as for that of their
seniors in post-graduate assignments.
3. See infra note 8.
4. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
7. A Model Code of Conduct for Nonjudicial Court Employees has been offered by the Ameri-
can Judicature Society. See Ozar, Kelly & Begue, Ethical Conduct of Nonjudicial Court Employees:
A Proposed Model Code, 73 JUDICATURE 126 (1989). It is intended for court clerks, docket clerks,
data processing personnel, bailiffs and judicial secretaries. AJS Model Code of Conduct for Nonjudi-
cial Court Employees, 73 JUDICATURE 138, 138 (1989) [hereinafter AJS Model Code]. Originally,
its authors intended to include law clerks as well. Ozar, Kelly & Begue, Ethical Conduct of State
Court Employees and Administrators: The Search for Standards, 71 JUDICATURE 262, 266 (1988).
However, in the final version, its authors explicitly omit from coverage law clerks, "who should be
held to a higher standard." AJS Model Code, supra at 138.
8. At one time, the standards of professional responsibility adopted by almost every state closely
resembled those in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated by the American Bar
Association in 1969. By the end of 1987, 25 states had modified their codes in response to the
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DR 8-101. Action as a Public OfficiaL (A) A lawyer who holds public office
shall not:
(3) Accept anything of value from any person when the lawyer
knows or it is obvious that the offer is for the purpose of influencing
his action as public official. 9
DR 9-101. Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety.
(B) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he
had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.
(C) A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence improp-
erly or upon irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body, or public
official. 10
Model Rule 1.12(b) (in pertinent part):
A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer, or
arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or attorney involved
in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially,
but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or
arbitrator. I I
Judges are bound by the standards of professional conduct adopted for
their court.12 By their terms, such standards expressly bind only judges, not
law clerks, but certain standards specifically address the judge's responsibil-
ity for the actions of his staff.
Two rules in the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct which refer to a judge's
staff are:
Rule 3.A Adjudicative Responsibilities
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his offi-
cial capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of his
staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction and control.
(6) A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or
Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the ABA in 1983 as a replacement for the Model
Code. M. SCHWARTZ & R. WYDICK, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 10 (2d ed. 1988).
9. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-101 (1980) (hereinafter MODEL
CODE); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(e) (1983) (hereinafter
MODEL RULES).
10. MODEL CODE DR 9-101 (B)-(C); see also MODEL RULES Rules 1.11, 1.12(b), 7.1(b), 8.4(e).
11. MODEL RULES Rule 1.12.
12. Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the Judicial Conference of the United States
have adopted, in whole or in substantial measure, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct promulgated
by the American Bar Association in 1972. For a current list of citations to the Code as adopted in
each state, see J. SHAMAN, S. LUBET, & J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.02 nn. 18-
19 (1990).
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impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar absten-
tion on the part of court personnel subject to his direction and control.
Rule 3.B Administrative Responsibilities
(2) A judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his
direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence
that apply to him. 1
3
Even when they are not expressly held by judicial standards, law clerks
can be otherwise held to those standards by the expectations of their judges.
At least two federal courts of appeal have concluded that what binds the
judge also binds the law clerk. 14 Additionally, law clerks in federal courts
are bound by a Code of Conduct for Law Clerks adopted by the Judicial
Conference of the United States in 198 1,I5 and some judges bind their law
clerks with oaths or written agreements. 16
ETHICALLY SENSITIVE AREAS FOR CLERK AND JUDGE
Three subjects are important enough to warrant particular discussion
about a law clerk's duty: the confidentiality of chambers, the appearance of
conflict of interest, and the limits imposed by decisionmaking on the record.
How well a law clerk fulfills these duties is rarely if ever noticed by anyone,
including her judge. What does attract (unwanted) attention is the occa-
13. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(3),(A)(6), 3(B)(2) (1972). In Texas, the State
Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished Supreme Court Justice William W. Kilgar-
lin in 1987 after two law clerks from his staff accepted free weekend vacations in Las Vegas from a
law firm with cases pending before his court. The Commission found that Justice Kilgarlin had
failed to require his staff to observe ethical standards. Blodgett, Texas Justices' Conduct Hit, 73
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1987, at 19; Taylor, Defiant Justices Say They Won't Quit, NAT'L L.J., Jun. 29,
1987, at 7, col. 1.
14. Hall v. Small Business Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983) (see infra text accompany-
ing note 29); Price Br'thers Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981) (see infra text accompanying note 48). Cf. In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980) (see infra text accompa-
nying note 21).
15. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 28
(198 1). The Judicial Conference was established by Congress in 1922. Myers, Origin of the Judicial
Conference, 57 A.B.A. J. 597, 597 (1971). Comprised of the Chief Justice, the chief judge of each
judicial circuit, and a district court judge from each circuit, the Conference is charged with oversee-
ing the conduct of business in the federal courts, and is empowered to make recommendations and
adopt rules which enhance court efficiency, fairness, and cost effectiveness. See 28 U.S.C. § 331
(1988). Certainly this equality of honor which binds the judge and her clerk is reflected as well in
the Code of Conduct for Law Clerks. The very language of the Canons of that Code closely parallels
in many instances that of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Code of Conduct for Law Clerks, as
most recently amended in 1988, appears as an appendix at the end of this article.
16. Comment, The Law Clerk's Duty of Confidentiality, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1230, 1236 (1981)
(hereinafter Confidential Duty).
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sional breach of one of these duties. The consequences of even a careless slip
can extend far beyond the remainder of the clerk's term with the court, af-
fecting not only her own professional reputation and career, but also the trust
her judge will extend to the clerks who follow in subsequent years.
WHAT GOES ON IN CHAMBERS STAYS IN CHAMBERS
A judge is bound by Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to perform
her duties impartially.1 7 She must not only refrain from public comment
about a pending or impending proceeding in any court, but must also require
similar abstention by her clerks.' 8 In 1919, a clerk for Justice McKenna of
the United States Supreme Court used inside information about decisions not
yet announced by the Court to speculate in the stock market. An investiga-
tion by the Attorney General resulted in both the law clerk's resignation and
his criminal indictment.' 9 In In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litiga-
tion,20 the court considered whether a trial judge should have been disquali-
fied after his law clerk volunteered her own opinions about the case to the
defendant's lawyer and commented to a reporter on a settlement proposal in
a related civil suit. The court of appeals found that the law clerk's comments
to counsel raised many questions of propriety and that her statement to the
press "most likely breached duties imposed upon her by Canons 3 A(6), and
3 B(2), of the Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges."'2' As the
cause of appellate review for her judge's abuse of discretion is not how a law
clerk would wish to be remembered - by her judge, by the courts, or by the
spectating bar.
WHAT GOES ON IN CHAMBERS STAYS IN CHAMBERS PART II
Aside from the law clerk's derivative duty to refrain from comments indi-
cating pre-judgment or bias regarding pending cases, he has a duty to pre-
serve the privacy of the court. Thus, long after the case has been completed,
an obligation may still exist to keep confidential that information to which
the clerk has been made privy only through the special access he acquired as
a member of the chambers staff. The authors of The Brethren: Inside the
Supreme Court bragged that more than 170 former law clerks had contrib-
uted inside information to their expose of the inner workings of the Supreme
Court.2 2 When law clerks or former law clerks tattle about the off-bench
17. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(1) (1972).
18. See id. at Canon 3(A)(6); CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS Canon 3(c).
19. Newland, supra note 1, at 310.
20. 614 F.2d 958, 963 (5th Cir. 1980).
21. Id. at 968 (citations omitted).
22. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 3-4
(1979). Writing with obvious journalistic pride, the authors noted:
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remarks, behavior, or collegiality of their judges, they violate the trust placed
in them when they are invited into the private world of the chambers. 23
Just as the cloak of confidentiality enhances the effectiveness of the rela-
tionship between attorney and client, it also enhances the effectiveness of the
relationship between law clerk and judge. One judge has written:
My relationship with my law clerks is a close and confidential one. If I
cannot speak freely to them, they cannot do their job for me. And I could
not speak freely to them if I thought that my questions, soul-searching, and
opinions would be made matters of public record or private conversation.
There is often a good deal of give and take and what finally emerges may
not have been anyone's original thought. If my half-formed ideas or pre-
liminary thoughts are not kept confidential by my law clerks-then I will
have to keep them confidential myself and that will seriously impair the
decision-making process. 24
Telling tales out of court is incompatible with the clerk's role as confidant
and sounding board. It also threatens a major benefit of the clerkship for
future clerks, and it should raise questions among the clerk's observers about
his capacity for protecting the secrets of his future law firm and its clients.
Most of the information in this book is based on interviews with more than two hundred
people, including several Justices, more than 170 former law clerks, and several dozen
former employees of the Court.... Virtually all of the interviews were conducted "on
background," meaning that the identity of the source will be kept confidential. This assur-
ance of confidentiality to our sources was necessary to secure their cooperation.
The sources who helped us were persons of remarkable intelligence. They had unusu-
ally precise recall about the handling of cases that came before the Court, particularly the
important ones. However, the core documentation for this book came from unpublished
material that was made available to us by dozens of sources who had access to the docu-
ments. We obtained internal memoranda between Justices, letters, notes taken at confer-
ence, case assignment sheets, diaries, unpublished drafts of opinions and, in several
instances, drafts that were never circulated even to the other Justices.
Id. What was intended by two journalists as a description of thorough and successful investigation
is also an indictment of the elite among American law graduates for their shocking disloyalty to
their Justices. But see Abramson, Should a Clerk Ever Reveal Confidential Information? 63 JUDI-
CATURE 361, 402 (1980), for the view that information furnished by law clerks to Woodward and
Armstrong regarding non-pending cases may serve the public interest by revealing deliberative im-
purities resulting largely from the dramatic politicization of the highest state and federal courts.
The political and historical value in disclosure may justify eventual release of non-public informa-
tion about courts and judges, and ought to persuade judges to consent to such publication. But it
ought not, at least during the judge's lifetime, ever justify tales of former confidential employees told
on their own initiative.
23. See In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the Judicial
Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488 (1 1th Cir. 1986). The court of appeals found that a
privilege for the benefit of the judge generally obtained with respect to communications between a
judge and his clerks, limited only by competing "concerns of great moment." Id. at 1524. Judicial
recognition of such a common law privilege evidences the importance which courts attach to their
institutional privacy, and underscores the gravity of its violation by young Lawyers in whom special
trust and confidence has been placed by their employer judges.
24. Anonymous judge quoted in Confidential Duty, supra note 16, at 1237.
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POTENTIAL CONFLICTS ARISING FROM FUTURE EMPLOYMENT
AND FAMILY
The brief terms of most clerkships make possible conflicts of interest and
the appearance of impropriety. A clerk who begins a term in chambers al-
ready assured of association afterwards with a particular firm would face a
conflict of interest were she to involve herself with a case in which her future
employers appear. In Oliva v. Heller,25 a law clerk was sued for more than
five million dollars in damages for working on a prisoner's petition for post-
conviction relief after having accepted an offer from the U.S. Attorney's of-
fice. 26 In Miller Industries, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 27 the court found
that a law clerk's continued participation in a case in which the clerk's future
employers were counsel required disqualification of his judge.28 In Hall v.
Small Business Administration,29 the court found, relying on 28 U.S.C. § 455,
that a magistrate should have recused himself when he learned on the first
day of trial that his only law clerk was a member of the plaintiff class in the
sexual discrimination suit, that she had left defendant's employ complaining
of sexual discrimination, and that she had accepted a job offer from plaintiffs'
counsel. 30
25. 670 F. Supp. 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 839 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1988).
26. The court found her entitled to derivative judicial immunity for actions within the scope of
her employment with the court. Id. at 526.
27. 516 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Ala. 1980).
28. Id. at 86, 89 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) which requires a judge to disqualify himself "in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
29. 695 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983).
30. Id. at 177-79. Other cases are collected in Annotation, Conduct or Bias of Law Clerk or
Other Judicial Support Personnel as Warranting Recusal of Federal Judge or Magistrate, 65 A.L.R.
FED. 775 (1983). The Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct thinks that
disqualification of the judge is not necessary so long as the clerk is excluded from the case in which
the future employer is involved. Advisory Op. No. 74 (Oct. 26, 1984). The Advisory Committee
takes the same position when the clerk's future employer is the United States' Attorney. Advisory
Op. No. 81 (Sept. 14, 1987). Compare the Conference's disparate treatment of the appearance of
impropriety arising from employment of a clerk's spouse in a case. In a 1977 Advisory Opinion, the
Committee on Judicial Activities relied upon "the spirit of Canon 3 C(l)(c)" in concluding that a
judicial clerk should not work on a case in which the firm employing his or her spouse appears. The
Committee's view did not depend on the spouse's personal involvement in the case, nor, conversely,
on the impenetrability of any "Chinese wall" within the firm. Distinguishing a prior ABA Formal
Opinion which allowed an adequately informed client to decide whether to continue representation
when his lawyer's spouse worked in an opposing firm, the Committee noted the absence of any
client to whom the law clerk or judge coud refer the decision. The Committee was unpersuaded
that referral to the attorneys would suffice in the alternative. Advisory Op. No. 5 1, Advisory Com-
mittee on Judicial Activities (Aug. 15, 1977).
The Committee also thought that a different question would be presented were the spouse an
Assistant United States Attorney, public defender, or other government attorney, because of the
absence of a financial interest on the spouse's part. Id. (citing Advisory Opinion No. 38). This view
fails to consider the importance of a spouse's interest in tenure and advancement as a government
lawyer. If public employment ambitions can be just as important to a clerk's spouse as private
1991]
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Many judges make it known to applicants for their clerkships that they
prefer young lawyers who will join local firms after their stint with the judge.
Such a preference increases the likelihood of conflicts involving law clerks,
and such clerks ought to be retained by judges only after consideration of the
concomitant risk to efficient chambers administration. In any case, the deci-
sion about what to do about an apparent conflict of interest, like most other
decisions in his court, belongs to the judge, not the clerk. "Judges recuse
themselves, not law clerks."' 31 Law clerks ought to heed the advice of Rule
1.12 of the Model Rules32 and keep their judges well informed about employ-
ment interviews and offers. 33
Judge Alvin B. Rubin, who authored the opinion in Hall v. Small Business
Administration, opined in a handbook for federal law clerks: "When a clerk
has accepted a position with an attorney or with a firm, that clerk should
cease further involvement in those cases in which the future employer has an
interest."' 34 Judge Rubin's strict view of law clerk purity no doubt stems
from his experience in an appellate court, where several judges are each
served by three law clerks. Withdrawal by one clerk will be relatively pain-
less for the appellate judge who can easily recruit a stand-in from his own or
from another judge's chambers. However, many other courts lack such re-
sources. Like federal magistrates, many state judges enjoy the services of but
one clerk; indeed, some judges must share a single clerk. Substitutes can be
hard to come by in rural courts.
The limitations of a small pool of available law clerks might seem well
illustrated by the web of conflicts potentially handicapping Judge Raymond
Acosta's use of his law clerks in mass tort litigation in Puerto Rico. Fifty-
one Puerto Rican law firms appeared for 2,300 defendants at a time when
less than 500 lawyers comprised the entire federal bar of the island. One
clerk's brother was a partner in a San Juan law firm representing 58 plain-
tiffs; the other clerk's brother was a member of the firm representing the
defendant corporation. In In re Allied-Signal, Inc.,"3 the Court of Appeals
employment ambitions, then the safeguards concerning judicial clerks married to public lawyers
ought to be as stringent as those for the clerk spouses of private lawyers.
31. Interview of Judge David Schwartz, United States Court of Claims (1981).
32. MODEL RULES Rule 1.12(b) states in part,
A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may
negotiate for employment with a party or attorney involved in a matter in which the clerk
is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the
judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator.
33. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS Canon 3(D). See generally Comment, Protecting the
Appearance of Judicial Impartiality in the Face of Law Clerk Employment Negotiations, 62 WASH.
L. REV. 813 (1987).
34. A. RUBIN & L. BARTELL, LAW CLERK HANDBOOK 23 (Rev. 1989).
35. See In re Allied Signal, Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 972-73 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
2561 (1990).
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declined to order a mistrial or disqualify Judge Acosta despite the potential
appearance of impropriety presented by his clerks' family connections. Writ-
ing for the court, Judge Breyer took some pains to distinguish this case from
others in which a law clerk's family connections create at least the appear-
ance of impropriety. Recognizing that "the appearance of impropriety" has
a relativist component, the Appeals Court noted that
The risk that a law clerk, or some other staff member, will have a brother
or sister or some other family member involved in this case is a likely con-
comitant of trying such a large case in a small district.... [A] knowledge-
able objective observer is therefore more likely to see the relation as
implicit in the special circumstances than as an odd coincidence the failure
to avoid which might suggest bias.36
In addition to the external context in which propriety is tested, Judge
Breyer noted that Judge Acosta had shown an appreciation for circum-
stances which demanded withdrawal by granting a recusal motion in an ear-
lier case in which both a former law clerk and a brother of the only available
current law clerk appeared as counsel. 37 In a complex case such as Allied
Signal, however, the benefit of the normally appropriate procedure of deny-
ing the clerk's participation in the case was outweighed by the potential con-
tributions of two career law clerks who had been with Judge Acosta since the
case began. 38
Judge Breyer appears not to have considered the relative ease with which
substitutes untarnished by family connections could have been recruited for
temporary assignment to Judge Acosta. Judge Breyer mistakenly measured
the pool of available law clerks by the number on the island of Puerto Rico.
Fixing the sum of available clerk resources at the number locally available
arbitrarily overstated the burden on Judge Acosta of preventing even the
appearance of impropriety. But judicial clerks ought to be at least as inter-
changeable as federal judges, when substitution is prompted by the appear-
ance of impropriety. 39 The pool of available substitutes should therefore be
36. Id. at 971-72.
37. Id. at 971 (citing Opinion and Order of Sept. 10, 1986, Pan American Grain, Inc. v. M/V
Freedom, Civil No. 84-1795 (D.P.R.)).
38. Id. at 972-73.
39. The chief judge of each of the federal circuits is authorized to temporarily assign a district
judge to another district within the circuit, or to the circuit's court of appeals, whenever the busi-
ness of the court so requires. Accord 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1988). The Chief Justice of the United States
may temporarily assign a district judge to another circuit, when the need arises. Id. See generally 1
C. MILLER, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE §§ 1.17 & 1.21-1.30 (3d ed., 1989 rev. vol.). A
recent example of the latter procedure is reported in United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463 (9th
Cir. 1989). During the period Aug. 1, 1988 through Jan. 31, 1989, 58 intercircuit assignments were
undertaken by 47 judges. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
supra note 15, at 18.
An intercircuit assignment particularly instructive in this context occurred in 1981, when a judge
1991]
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measured nationwide. Certainly volunteers among judicial clerks and staff
attorneys unrelated to members of the law firms involved in the suit could
have been found elsewhere in the First Circuit (if not elsewhere in the federal
court system) willing to take an assignment to Judge Acosta's chambers in
San Juan - particularly if they were approached in the wintertime. In de-
clining to order Judge Acosta to remove his clerks from the case, Judge
Breyer assigned too little weight to the importance of consistency in dealing
with questions of judicial impropriety and too much weight, as did Judge
Acosta, to the court's convenience. Whether real or imagined, the influence
said by some to be exercised by law clerks over their judges4O makes the
appearance of impropriety by a law clerk as serious as the appearance of
impropriety by his judge. Rules and remedies for the former are reasonably
drawn from among those for the latter.4 '
As Judge Acosta's case illustrates, family relationships, like employment,
can produce apparent conflicts of interest for the law clerk. In Parker v.
Connors Steel Co.,42 the court found an appearance of partiality where the
law clerk's father was a partner in the firm representing a party. While the
appellate court did not require the trial judge's recusal in either Parker or
Allied Signal, the judges' handling of the issue came under close scrutiny on
appeal. To avoid the necessity for such scrutiny, the law clerk owes the
judge prompt notice of either family or career connections with a case in the
judge's court.
Federal law prohibits the appointment of a federal judge's family member
to "any office or duty in any [federal] court."' 43 The Comptroller General
has stated that the position of law clerk is not an office or duty within the
of the Eastern District of Virgina was ordered by Chief Justice Burger to San Juan. Designation of
District Judge for Service in Another Circuit (the Hon. Robert R. Merhige, Jr. to the District of
Puerto Rico) (June 13, 1981); Inter-Circuit Assignment of a United States Judge, Certificate of
Need, United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico (1st Cir., March 24, 1981). In
San Juan, Judge Merhige considered a motion for disbarment brought by the governor of Puerto
Rico, Carlos Romero Barcelo, against his apparent successor and political nemesis, Rafael Her-
nandez Colon. The motion was based upon Hernandez Colon's televised claim that Romero
Barcelo had hired an assassin to kill Hernandez Colon and burn down the building where guberna-
torial ballots were being counted. In re Hernandez Colon, No. 80 Misc. 0052, December 28, 1982.
This cause cilkbre pitted the leaders of Puerto Rico's two major political parties against each other
in federal court. Neither Chief Judge Coffin nor Chief Justice Burger appears to have regarded the
island's small coterie of federal judges as the total pool from which a judge had to be drawn.
40. See, e.g., Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Dec. 13, 1957, at 74; Rogers, Do Law Clerks Wield Power in Supreme Court Cases?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 21, 1958, at 114; see also Crump, Law Clerks.- Their Roles and Rela-
tionships with Their Judges, 69 JUDICATURE 236 (1986); Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better or
Worse?, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 321, 326-27 (1988).
41. A judge would not inappropriately express himself on the subject by paraphrasing Caesar: "I
wished my clerk to be not so much as suspected." Cf PLUTARCH, LIvEs, CAESAR, § 10.
42. 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 458 states: "No person shall be appointed to or employed in any office or duty in
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meaning of this prohibition," so the anti-nepotism statute apparently does
not prevent a judge from appointing as a law clerk his own or a colleague's
relative.45 The Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Codes of Con-
duct has announced, however, that the Code of Judicial Conduct sets a stan-
dard stricter than that of the nepotism statute, and prohibits a judge from
hiring as her clerk the son or daughter of a judge sitting on the same court.4
The Committee relied upon Canons 2 and 3(B)(4) as the basis for its opin-
ion.47 A similar limitation ought to bind every judge.
JUDGES AND THEIR CLERKS ARE CONSTRAINED BY THE RECORD
As the judge's research assistant, the law clerk is free to investigate as
thoroughly as time permits the legal issues presented in a case before the
court. The same is not true for issues of fact. A law clerk must curb her
curiosity about matters of fact when it cannot be satisfied by what has been
placed in the record. She is not free to do her own investigation to supple-
ment facts provided by the parties, except as to facts of which the court is
free to take judicial notice. Such facts generally include only those within
everyday common knowledge and those readily ascertainable from indisputa-
ble sources. 48 Otherwise, the law clerk must confine herself to the record, or
else she and her judge can be accused of prejudice against a party.
In Price Brothers v. Philadelphia Gear Corp. 9 a pipe manufacturer
claimed that gears supplied by the defendant in a pipe-making machine were
defective, amounting to a breach of warranty. At some point before trial, the
judge's law clerk travelled, without notifying either party, to inspect the
any court who is related by affinity or con-sanguinity within the degree of first cousin to any justice
or judge of such court." 28 U.S.C. § 458 (1988).
44. See supra note 2. The opinion leaves very much open the applicability of the statute to staff
attorney appointment.
45. It is at least arguable, however, that the Comptroller General was simply wrong. The dis-
tinction he makes might make some sense in situations where law clerk salaries were paid out of
pocket by the judges for whom they worked. However, as already noted, by 1886, Congress had
authorized payment for one clerical assistant for Supreme Court Justices and increased that to two
in 1919. Federal circuit judges gained their first congressionally authorized clerks in 1930, and in
the year of the Comptroller General's opinion, certain district judges were allowed the same assist-
ance. J. OAKLEY & R. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 18.
46. Advisory Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. No. 64 (Aug. 25, 1980). In this con-
text, the Committee regarded each district and circuit court as separate. A majority of the Commit-
tee thought a judge could hire the relative of another judge on a different court in the same circuit,
so long as that clerk was excluded from any participation in cases from the other court.
47. Id.
48. See FED. R. EvID. 201. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, §§ 328-35 (3d ed. 1984);
9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2569 (Chadbourn rev. 1981); Davis, "There is a Book Out... " An
Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987); Morgan, Judi-
cial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269 (1944).
49. 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981).
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machine as it was installed in the plaintiff's factory. On appeal, the court
found that such an adventure raised serious questions about the impartiality
of fact-finding by the trial judge and created a presumption of prejudice to
the defendant at trial.50 In Kennedy v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,51 a
law clerk (with the unfortunate name of James Madison) on a rainy evening
took his date to inspect the grocery store site of a slip and fall. When defend-
ant's counsel found out, he called the law clerk to testify at trial. On appeal,
the court found sufficient prejudice from the clerk's violation of canon
3(A)(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of the Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule 60552 to warrant reversal and remand. 53 "It was his duty," wrote the
court, "as much as that of the trial judge to avoid any contacts outside the
record that might affect the outcome of the litigation."'54 What may have
seemed to be an extra effort by a diligent subordinate at the time can prove a
life-long professional embarrassment for the law clerk who investigates
outside the record.
The obligation to remain within the scope of the record goes beyond re-
fraining from inspections of the scene. It extends to ex parte communication
to the judge of facts relevant to disposition of the case. 55 The law clerk's role
as a judge's research assistant does not necessarily make every communica-
tion between clerk and judge proper. On the contrary, when a clerk offers a
judge deciding a case information about anything but law, the clerk usurps
the role of counsel. Such communications are improper, only in part because
they are typically ex parte.
As a judge's research assistant, a clerk is expected to discover relevant law
in published cases and promulgated statutes or regulations. To discover the
law itself, a clerk is often expected to add the gloss of its published interpre-
tations by legal scholars. That the law clerk frequently delivers to the judge
his findings about law only after the record is closed, and without particular
notice to the attorneys, seems nevertheless fair for the parties because of a
convention regarding accessibility: The law and its interpretation is pre-
sumed to be out there for every lawyer to find.5 6 Clearly, albeit curiously,
this convention reaches not only law found in the public record, but also its
50. Id. at 419-20.
51. 551 F.2d 593, 594 (5th Cir. 1977).
52. "[T]he judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection
need be made in order to preserve the point." FED. R. EvID. 605.
53. 551 F.2d at 596-97. Acknowledging that Rule 605, by its terms, applied only to the judge,
the court of appeals nevertheless found that presenting the presiding judge's law clerk to the jury as
a witness posed the same threat to the jury's independence of judgment as would presenting the
judge himself. Id. at 598.
54. Id. at 596.
55. "A judge should.., neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concern-
ing a pending or impending proceeding." CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(4) (1972).
56. See 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 48, § 2569. "Since [legal facts] are to be decided by the judge,
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interpretation, which is often found in privately published journals and trea-
tises. In light of this convention, the clerk and his judge do not prejudice a
party when the clerk delivers ex parte the results of legal research, even when
such research includes cases or law review articles unmentioned by counsel
in briefs or comments on the record. Indeed, a clerk's discovery of binding
precedent not previously offered by counsel ought to be a moment of triumph
for the clerk and satisfaction for his judge.
The same is not, and should not be, true for the clerk's report of facts
other than law and its associated commentary. Here applies the court's obli-
gation to consider and decide within the constraints of a record dictated by
counsel. Just as a law clerk's visit to the scene breaches the record of the
case, so should a law clerk's gleaning of facts by research in other than legal
libraries or databases. Where, for example, the record leaves the judge un-
clear about how a machine, a bank, a drug, or a culture operates, the clerk
ought not to repair to the local library for a text on the subject. Neither the
social nor the physical sciences ought to be presumed to be as accessible to
the legally trained as the law and its interpretation. 57 Thus, the convention
regarding communications about law should not reach facts,58 and a clerk
generally ought not to engage in research to enlarge upon the non-legal facts
of the record.
Judicial notice, an alternative convention, permits a judge to introduce
into the record certain facts, but only after alerting counsel and affording
them opportunity to challenge or qualify the source from which these facts
are to be drawn. 59 Thus, if a judge and her clerk conclude that research to
he is at liberty to investigate the facts for himself in addition to receiving the evidence which the
parties may offer." Id. at 725 (emphasis in original).
57. My colleague, Professor Andre Moenssens, has reminded me that law review articles are
sometimes improperly relied upon for non-legal facts as well as, or instead of, legal interpretations.
He tells of a series of law review notes and comments which all reported criticism of DNA testing
(for identification of bodily secretions) made by scientists who had assumed an adversarial position
regarding DNA identification reliability. The criticism appeared in an article by experts employed
by the defense in a well-publicized trial. Their views were never subjected to expert peer review or
presented to juried scientific journals; nevertheless, these opinions achieved more and more prestige
in the legal literature as they were picked up and repeated by student authors who failed to ade-
quately survey the relevant scientific literature. See Moenssens, DNA Evidence and its Critics-How
Valid Are the Challenges?, 31 JURIMETRICS J. at nn. 12, 29, & 40 (1990).
58. Justice Marshall wrote in United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 150 (1833):
[T]he judge sees only with judicial eyes, and knows nothing respecting any particular
case of which he is not informed judicially; ... The looseness which would be introduced
into judicial proceedings [otherwise] would prove fatal to the great principles of justice.
59. FED. R. EvID. 201(e). A complementary rule regarding legal facts exists in some jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EvID. 202; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.202 (West 1979); MoNT. R. EVID.
202; TEX. R. EvID. 202. No such rule exists in federal courts. These rules pertaining to legal facts
are permissive, that is, they make explicit the judge's power to take notice of legal facts other than
those offered by counsel; they do not incorporate the common notice and comment limitations (like
those in FED. R. EVID. 201(c) and (e) on taking notice of facts).
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produce additional facts is essential, the record should be reopened in order
to record notice to counsel and their response to either the importance of the
research or the validity of its results.
If supplementation of the facts in the record by a law clerk's research is
normally to be discouraged and is only to be permitted in most instances
after notice and comment by counsel, then it should follow with equal vigor
that a clerk cannot offer his judge his expertise in matters other than law.
Judges Leventhal and Wyzanski are both known to have engaged particular
law clerks because of their non-legal expertise. 60 Judge Wyzanski appointed
a Harvard economist as his law clerk to assist with a difficult antitrust case.
61
Judge Leventhal employed a scientifically trained clerk to help with difficult
environmental cases. While Judge Wyzansky later admitted he would not
make another such appointment, in part because of his concerns about the
undue influence on the judge of an expert in chambers,62 Judge Leventhal
called for special clerkships reserved for the scientifically trained.63 When a
law clerk, also trained as an economist or a biologist, is available within
chambers to offer economic or biologic information to a judge deciding fac-
tual issues of economics or biology, the parties' right to a decision on the
record is violated. Affording notice and an opportunity for comment on the
clerk's findings cannot alleviate the harm without leading inexorably to the
law clerk's transmutation from chambers staff to witness.
Success in a field other than law ought not, however, create an obstacle to
60. Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of Columbia Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 135, 152 (1982).
61. Id. at 152 n.80.
62. Wyzanski, The Law of Change, 38 N.M.Q. 5, 18-20 (1962). Judge Wyzanski's law clerk,
Professor Carl Kaysen, agreed with his judge that the chambers expert created more problems than
he solved:
[I]t may be argued that everything that goes towards influencing the Court's decision,
outside what is in the mind of the judge himself should be spread on the record.... Even
if it is assumed that every judge is as well able to interpret what an economic expert tells
him in private, use what is useful, and reject what is not, as Judge Wyzanski clearly was,
and that therefore the parties are in no way prejudiced by this procedure, it may be argued
that the adversary process is changed in an undesirable way. Ideally, the judge functions
as an expert only in law; in other areas he is a layman, one unusually gifted in the art of
receiving instruction from those temporary experts, counsel for the contending parties, on
the substantive, non-legal facts before him. So instructed, he decides between the contend-
ing views presented to him. To inject into this process an expert in a particular class of
facts and to allow him private access to the judge, protected from the scrutiny of examina-
tion by the parties, undermines to some extent the adversary character of the proceedings.
The more weight the expert has in the outcome, the more it can be argued that an ex parte
process is being substituted for the traditional adversary proceedings....
Webster, The Use of Economics Experts as Witnesses in Antitrust Litigation, 17 THE RECORD 456,
460 (1962) (quoting from a speech by Carl Kaysen).
63. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
509, 550-552 (1974).
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subsequent appointment as a law clerk by a judge overzealous to prevent the
appearance of impropriety by the suggestion of ex parte fact finding or im-
proper influence. Any limitation on the communications between a judge
and her chambers staff must, in the end, be largely self-enforced. A judge
who announces a preference for one or more non-legal backgrounds ought to
make clear to her law clerks from the outset how the record must limit the
clerk even in the field of his expertise. Just as a careful clerk working for a
careful judge will always relate each proposed conclusion of law to a case or
statute, a careful clerk working for a careful judge will always relate each
finding of fact to the specific part of the record in which supporting evidence
can be found. Such a practice is the best safeguard against extra-record fact
finding.
CONCLUSIONS
Judicial clerks who have been admitted to the bar are obliged to conform
their professional conduct to ethical standards adopted by the bar, unless a
higher standard applies because of their special status as court insiders.
Whether admitted to the bar or not, all judicial clerks must conform to cer-
tain standards set by their judges. Some of these judge-made standards, par-
ticularly those derived from standards orginally imposed on the judges
themselves, have appeared in case law. Others are transmitted informally by
judges as part of each clerk's orientation. The standards which bind judicial
clerks should also bind staff attorneys and students working as interns.
The most important of these behavioral norms follow from the respect
owed litigants by all court personnel and the loyalty owed judges by all staff
members. From respect for litigants comes the duty to act impartially and
with meticulous regard for the record; from loyalty to the judge comes the
duty to preserve even the appearance of impartiality and the duty to keep
silent about chambers matters.
A judge's law clerk should watch for potential conflicts of interest arising
from relationships of family or future employment. A clerk should immedi-
ately bring any potential conflicts to the attention of her judge. It is for the
judge, and not the clerk, to decide when the potential is serious. A judge's
law clerk should not gossip. His reticence should reach not only matters
under the court's active consideration, but also anything which the clerk has
learned through the special access the job affords. This duty survives the end
of the clerkship. A judge's law clerk should not investigate, nor introduce to
the deliberation of the court, facts about any subject but the law. Upon each
law clerk's faithfulness to these standards rest that clerk's reputation, every
judge's confidence, and the future of the office.
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APPENDIX
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS
CANON 1
A LAW CLERK SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF
THE JUDICIARY AND THE OFFICE
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A law clerk should observe high standards of conduct so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provi-
sions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.
The standards of this Code shall not affect or preclude other more stringent
standards required by law, by court order, or by direction of the appointing
judge.
CANON 2
A LAW CLERK SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES
A law clerk should not engage in any activities that would put into ques-
tion the propriety of the law clerk's conduct in carrying out the duties of the
office. A law clerk should not allow family, social, or other relationships to
influence official conduct or judgment. A law clerk should not lend the pres-
tige of the office to advance the private interests of others; nor should the law
clerk convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the law clerk.
CANON 3
A LAW CLERK SHOULD PERFORM THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE
IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY
The official duties of a law clerk take precedence over all other activities.
Official duties include all the duties of the office prescribed by law, resolution
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the court in which the law
clerk serves, and the appointing judge. In the performance of these duties,
the following standards apply:
A. A law clerk should respect and comply with the law and should con-
duct himself or herself at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and of the
office.
B. A law clerk should maintain professional competence in the profes-
sion. A law clerk should be dignified, courteous, and fair to all per-
sons with whom the law clerk deals in the law clerk's official capacity.
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A law clerk should diligently discharge the responsibilities of the of-
fice. A law clerk should bear in mind the obligation to treat fairly and
courteously the general public as well as the legal profession.
C. The relationship between judge and law clerk is essentially a confiden-
tial one. A law clerk should abstain from public comment about a
pending or impending proceeding in the court in which the law clerk
serves. A law clerk should never disclose to any person any confiden-
tial information received in the course of the law clerk's duties, nor
should the law clerk employ such information for personal gain. This
subsection does not prohibit a law clerk from making public state-
ments in the course of official duties to the extent authorized by the
appointing judge.
D. A law clerk should inform the appointing judge of any circumstance
or activity of the law clerk that might serve as a basis for disqualifica-
tion of the judge, e.g., a prospective employment relation with a law
firm, association of the law clerk's spouse with a law firm or litigant,
etc.
CANON 4
A LAW CLERK MAY ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE LAW, THE
LEGAL SYSTEM, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
A law clerk, subject to the proper performance of official duties, may en-
gage in the following law-related activities:
A. A law clerk may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other
activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration
of justice.
B. A law clerk may serve as a member, officer, or director of an organiza-
tion or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law,
the legal system, or the administration of justice.
C. A law clerk may promote the development of professional organiza-
tions and foster the interchange of technical information and experi-
ence with others in the profession. A law clerk may make himself or
herself available to the public at large for speaking engagements and
public appearances designed to enhance the public's knowledge of the
operation of the court system.
CANON 5
A LAW CLERK SHOULD REGULATE EXTRA-OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES TO
MINIMIZE THE RISK OF CONFLICT WITH OFFICIAL DUTIES
A. Avocational Activities. A law clerk may write, lecture, teach, and
speak on nonlegal subjects and engage in the arts, sports, and other
social and recreational activities, if such avocational activities do not
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detract from the dignity of the office or interfere with the performance
of official duties.
B. Civic and Charitable Activities. A law clerk may participate in civic
and charitable activities that do not detract from the dignity of the
office or interfere with the performance of official duties. A law clerk
may serve as an officer, director, trustee or nonlegal advisor of an edu-
cational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization and so-
licit funds for any such organization subject to the following
limitations:
(1) A law clerk should not use or permit the use of the prestige of the
office in the solicitation of funds.
(2) A law clerk should not solicit court personnel to contribute to or
participate in any civic or charitable activity, but may call their
attention to a general fund-raising campaign such as the Com-
bined Federal Campaign and the United Way.
(3) A law clerk should not solicit funds from lawyers or persons likely
to come before the court in which the law clerk serves.
C. Financial Activities.
(1) A law clerk should refrain from financial and business dealings that
tend to detract from the dignity of the office, interfere with the
proper performance of official duties, exploit the law clerk's posi-
tion, or involve the law clerk in frequent transactions with individu-
als likely to come in contact with the law clerk or the court in
which the law clerk serves. During the clerkship, a law clerk may
seek and obtain employment to commence after the completion of
the clerkship; if any law firm, lawyer, or entity with whom a law
clerk has been employed or is seeking or has obtained future em-
ployment appears in any matter pending before the appointing
judge, the law clerk should promptly bring this fact to the attention
of the appointing judge, and the extent of the law clerk's perform-
ance of duties in connection with such matter should be determined
by the appointing judge.
(2) Neither a law clerk nor a member of the law clerk's household
should solicit or accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone
except for-
(a) a gift incident to a public testimonial, books, tapes and other
resource materials supplied by publishers on a complimentary
basis for official use, or an invitation to the law clerk and a
family member to attend a bar-related function or an activity
devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice;
(b) a gift, award or benefit incident to the business, profession or
other separate activity of a spouse or other family member of a
law clerk residing in the law clerk's household, including gifts,
awards and benefits for the use of both the spouse or other fam-
ily member and the law clerk (as spouse or family member),
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provided the gift, award or benefit could not reasonably be per-
ceived as intended to influence the law clerk in the performance
of official duties;
(c) ordinary social hospitality;
(d) a gift from a relative or friend, for a special occasion, such as a
wedding, anniversary or birthday, if the gift is fairly commen-
surate with the occasion and the relationship;
(e) a gift, bequest, favor or loan from a relative or close personal
friend whose appearance or interest in a case would in any
event require that the law clerk take no official action with re-
spect to the case;
(f) a loan from a lending institution in its regular course of busi-
ness on the same terms generally available to persons who are
not law clerks;
(g) a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms and
based on the same criteria applied to other applicants; or
(h) any other gift, bequest, favor or loan, only if:
(i) the donor has not sought and is not seeking to do business
with the court or other entity served by the law clerk; or
(ii) the donor is not a party or other person who has had or is
likely to have any interest in the performance of the law
clerk's official duties.
(3) A law clerk should report the value of any gift, bequest, favor, or loan
as required by statute or by the Judicial Conference of the United
States.
D. Practice of Law. A law clerk shall not practice law in any federal, state, or
local court, or undertake to perform legal services for any private client in
return for remuneration. This prohibition, however, shall not be construed
to preclude the performance of routine legal work necessary to the manage-
ment of the personal affairs of the law clerk or a member of the law clerk's
family, so long as:
(1) Such work is done without compensation or for nominal compensation;
(2) It does not require any act, including the entry of an appearance in a
court of the United States, that would suggest that the position of Law
Clerk is being misused, that preferential treatment is being sought by
virtue of the holding of that position, or that would otherwise be incon-
sistent with the law clerk's primary responsibility to the court; and
(3) So long as such activity does not have actual conflict or appear in con-
flict with court duties or will not reflect adversely on the court or create
the appearance of impropriety.
A law clerk should ascertain and observe any limitations imposed by the
appointing judge or the court on which the appointing judge serves concern-
ing the practice of law by a former law clerk before the judge or the court.
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CANON 6
A LAW CLERK SHOULD REGULARLY FILE ANY REQUIRED REPORTS OF
COMPENSATION RECEIVED FOR ALL EXTRA-OFFICIAL
ACTIVITIES
A law clerk may receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses for
all extra-official activities permitted by this Code, if the source of such pay-
ments does not influence or give the appearance of influencing the law clerk
in the performance of official duties or otherwise give the appearance of im-
propriety, subject to the following restrictions:
A. Compensation. Compensation should not exceed a reasonable amount
nor should it exceed that normally received by others for the same
activity.
B. Expense Reimbursement. Expense reimbursement should be limited
to the actual cost of travel, food, and lodging reasonably incurred by a
law clerk and, where appropriate to the occasion, by the law clerk's
spouse. Any payment in excess of such an amount is compensation.
C. Public Reports. A law clerk should make and file such reports as may
be prescribed by law or by the Judicial Conference of the United
States.
Notwithstanding the above, a law clerk shall not receive any salary, or any
supplementation of salary, as compensation for official services from any
source other than the Government of the United States.
CANON 7
A LAW CLERK SHOULD REFRAIN FROM POLITICAL ACTIVITY
A. Political Activity. A law clerk should refrain from political activity; a
law clerk should not act as a leader or hold office in a political organi-
zation; a law clerk should not make speeches for or publicly endorse a
political organization or candidate; a law clerk should not solicit funds
for or contribute to a political organization, candidate for political or
public office; a law clerk should not otherwise engage in political
activities.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF COMPLIANCE
Persons to whom this Code becomes applicable should arrange their affairs
as soon as reasonably possible to comply with it and should do so in any
event within thirty days of the appointment.
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